A Question of Needlessness

Selling Iron Dome to Australia

There are currently 10 mobile Iron Dome systems in use in Israel. Photo credit: Mohammed Abed

The world of defence policy is truly another planet. There, budgets are given to astronomical burgeoning and bizarre readings. Threats can be invented or exaggerated. Insecurity can be inflated. Decisions for the next project supposedly more lethal and more effective than ever can be made with cavalier disregard to realities. And the next cockeyed, buffoonish idea can be given a run for other people’s money. Those other people are, as always, the good tax paying citizenry of a country.

Australia has been doing superbly of late in this regard. It has given over territory and money to the United States, its appointed arch defender, so that the security of Washington’s imperium can be assured. It has done so in a manner suggesting advanced dementia, its politicians and strategists drivelling about the need to combat the barbarian yellow-red hordes to the north in a “changing security environment”.

First came the AUKUS trilateral security pact with the US and the United Kingdom, which enshrines the costly fantasy of nuclear-powered submarines Australia may never get and certainly does not need. Nor is there an obligation on the part of the US to part with any, a prospect ever more unlikely given the failure of its own submarine base to keep pace with annual production. Let’s not even start on the prospects of an AUKUS-designed submarine, which will be lucky to make it to the construction stage without sinking.

To itemise any number of foolish ventures and items being pursued by the Australian defence department would be injurious to one’s well being. This is largely because they keep coming in their risible daftness. Of late, the idea that Australia needs an anti-missile defence shield along the lines of Israel’s Iron Dome system is becoming more than a flirtation. And it’s being given a sense of frisson by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the Israeli company responsible for implementing and maintaining it.

The chance for Rafael to shine came at the Indo Pacific International Maritime Exposition, an event running from 4 to 6 November. Its presence, along with the Australian subsidiary of Israel’s primary unmanned vehicle manufacturer Elbit Systems, had piqued activists from the Palestine Action Group (PAG), who gathered just before the opening of the exposition to protest that fact.

A predictably muscular reaction from the New South Wales police followed. According to PAG organiser Josh Lees, they “immediately attacked” the peaceful gathering with pepper spray and horses. The NSW Premier Chris Minns, for his part, was enthralled by the economic prospects of the gathering: defence exports were there to be grown, deals to be made. That these were with merchants of death was no big matter. “They’re not selling nuclear weapons … we want to see the industry grow.”

For its part, Rafael had pulled out the bells and whistles. The company, according to its display, offered “an integrated, combat-proven portfolio that delivers end-to-end protection and impactful projection for Australia’s naval forces, ensuring freedom of action in Australia’s northern approaches and across vital sea lines of communication.”

In an interview at the exposition, the company’s vice president of international business development, Gideon Weiss, hawked Iron Dome’s technology with salesmanship enthusiasm. “The perception that Australia is far and distant and isolated is completely untrue,” he remarked with stern certitude. “There’s absolutely no reason in the world why any Australian would think… that in a conflict, Australia would not be attacked.” The unasked question here is why Australia would make itself an appealing target to begin with. But Weiss did not break his stride: “Your enemies have a great arsenal of ballistic missiles, hypersonic ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. Why wouldn’t they use them against you if they wanted to?”

Asked whether the company’s message had bitten in Canberra, Weiss was assured. The “capability and the maturity of the technology” had been noted by Australia’s defence wonks and Rafael was always keen to focus on “sovereignty, about the Australian industrial context.” There was “infrastructure which to Australianise, if you will, these technologies.”

The company has shown ample familiarity with the soil they wish to till. The Australian Defence Strategic Review of 2023 declared the need to “deliver a layered integrated air and missile system (IAMD) operation capability urgently. This must comprise a suite of appropriate command and control systems, sensors, air defence aircraft and surface (land and maritime) based missile systems.” The current program to develop a “common IAMD capability” was “not structured to deliver a minimum viable capability in the shortest period of time but is pursuing a long-term near perfect solution at an unaffordable cost.”

Defence analysts called upon to comment on the matter are slavering. Jennifer Parker, a regular talking head on the subject, rues the fact that Australia can never, given its geographical size, be protected in its entirety. “Unlike Israel, where they can defend the entire country against missiles broadly … that’s not feasible for Australia because of our size.” Focus, she suggests, on the “critical infrastructure elements that we need to protect, like HMAS Stirling, Pine Gap and bases around Darwin, and design integrated air and missile defence around that concept”.

The United States Studies Centre, an Australian outpost soddenly friendly to the military-industrial complex and the needs of the imperium, is also unrelenting about the need for a more expansive missile defence system. Peter Dean, senior advisor on defence strategy, cites “the lack of effective ground-based air defence and an Integrated Air and Missile Defence system” as “the most critical gap in the achievement of Australia’s strategic goals.”

Another outfit most friendly to US interests, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, is also much in love with missile interception. “If we want to get serious about integrated missile defence,” ASPI senior analyst Malcolm Davis posits, “we need to have long-range, ground-based interceptor missiles that can handle threats like intermediate range ballistic missiles launched by China.”

The next wasteful program of military expenditure looms happily on the horizon, leaving the question of need unanswered. Weiss has good reasons to be optimistic that a train has been set in motion. “I wouldn’t want to name names,” he says with confidence, “but everyone knows us very well.”